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Nicholas R. VandenBos 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In an attempt to stave off what it saw as impending litigation, Shell 
Gulf of Mexico, Inc. filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act 
against a range of environmental groups opposed to Shell’s oil 
exploration in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas of Alaska’s Arctic 
Coast. Shell requested a declaratory judgment that its oil spill 
response plans, as approved by the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement, did not violate the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Although noting the novelty of Shell’s argument, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded 
the district court had erred in determining a justiciable case existed 
between Shell and the environmental groups. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue before the court in Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v. 
Center for Biological Diversity was whether the parties possessed 
adverse legal interests under the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”) such that Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. (“Shell”) was 
entitled to a declaratory judgment on the sufficiency of two oil 
spill response plans as approved by the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement (“Bureau”).1 While noting that Shell 
did have a substantial practical interest in any litigation the 
defendant environmental groups might file against the Bureau for 
its decision to approve Shell’s oil spill containment plans, the 
Ninth Circuit held that practical interest alone was not enough.2 
Instead, under the Declaratory Judgment Act (“Act”), opposing 
parties in an action for declaratory judgment must possess adverse 
interests as evaluated through the law under which the declaratory 
judgment suit is filed.3 
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Beaufort and Chukchi seas of Alaska’s Arctic Coast 
hold the potential to provide significant oil and gas reserves.4 Shell 
                                                        
1
 Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v. Center for Biological Diversity, 771 F.3d 632, 634 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
2
 Id. at 636. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id. at 633-634. 
Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc. v. Center for Biological Diversity 2 
has heavily invested in exploration and development of those 
resources.5 In addition to their energy potential, the Beaufort and 
Chukchi also host a healthy ecosystem supporting significant 
populations of wildlife. 6  As a result, “[m]any environmental 
organizations and citizen activists, including the defendants in this 
case, vehemently oppose Shell’s Arctic oil and gas exploration 
activities.”7  Further, such organizations frequently litigate in an 
effort to prevent Arctic oil and gas exploration, and some have 
“stated their intentions to continue resisting Shell’s plans in 
court.”8 
 
Shortly after obtaining approval from the Bureau of two oil 
spill response plans, as required by the Oil Pollution Act, Shell 
filed suit against the Center for Biological Diversity and others 
(“Defendants”) “seeking a declaration that the Bureau’s approval 
did not violate the APA.”9 Shell “alleged that the environmental 
groups were engaged in an ongoing campaign to prevent Shell 
from drilling for oil in the Arctic, and that some of the 
environmental groups had threatened to bring litigation 
challenging the Bureau’s approval of the oil spill response 
plans.”10 According to Shell, based on past opposition to Shell’s 
activities, and public criticism, it was “virtually certain” that the 
Defendants would file suit to challenge Bureau approval.11 
 
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued Shell’s 
lawsuit failed to satisfy the Article III case or controversy 
requirement.12 The district court denied the motion.13 Some of the 
defendants subsequently filed suit against the Bureau, challenging 
its approval of the oil spill response plans.14  That case, Alaska 
Wilderness League v. Jewell, No. 13 35866 (9th Cir. filed Sept. 17, 
2013) was consolidated with the instant case, and the district court 
entered summary judgment for Shell.15 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Oil Pollution Act requires companies to file oil spill 
response plans before “handling, storing, or transporting oil.”16 
Only after receiving approval from the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement may companies proceed with oil 
operations.17 
 
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, “any court of the 
United States … may declare the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party seeking such declaration.”18  However, the Act 
“does not create new substantive rights.” 19  Instead, it “merely 
expands the remedies available in federal courts.”20 A purpose of 
the Act is to give potential defendants a chance to determine 
whether they have “any legal obligations to their potential 
adversaries.”21 As such, the Act provides a “procedural mechanism 
for removing the threat of impending litigation,” but does not 
broaden federal court jurisdiction.22   
 
Thus, declaratory judgments in federal courts are restricted 
to “’controversies which are such in the constitutional sense.’”23 
To meet this standard, a declaratory judgment must present facts 
showing “there is a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to 
warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”24 
 
The Ninth Circuit applied this reasoning to Shell’s claims 
to find that it and the Defendants did not have adverse legal 
interests. Although Shell argued its case was justiciable in part 
because the parties were “mired in a substantial, real, and 
immediate controversy over the lawfulness of its Arctic oil and gas 
explorations,” the court held Shell and the environmental groups 
lacked the “adverse legal interests” required for federal courts to 
possess subject matter jurisdiction. 25  For this reason, the court 
found it unnecessary to address whether Shell presented sufficient 
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evidence that a “substantial controversy” existed between the 
parties 26 
 
To assert an adverse legal interest, “a party bringing a 
declaratory judgment action must have been a proper party had the 
defendant brought suit on the underlying cause of action.’”27 To 
evaluate “the adverse legal interests arising from the law 
underlying the request for declaratory relief, courts examine both 
the persons who can assert rights under that law and those who 
have obligations under it.”28 The court identified the APA as the 
law underlying Shell’s claim, and noted that actions under the 
APA “may be brought only against federal agencies.”29 Further, 
the court noted that claims under the APA cannot be brought 
against private parties.30 Therefore, the court concluded, Shell and 
the environmental groups did not possess adverse interests. Instead, 
the “only entities with adverse legal interests [were] the Bureau 
and the environmental groups.”31 
 
Holding otherwise, the court noted, would have two 
noteworthy, and unusual, effects. 32  The first would “allow the 
district court to declare the Bureau’s actions unlawful under the 
APA in a judgment that is not binding on the Bureau itself,” 
because the Bureau would not have participated in the lawsuit33 
Second, by allowing the lawsuit to proceed, and assuming the 
Bureau did not intervene, the court would allow “the lawfulness of 
agency action to be adjudicated without hearing the agency’s own 
justification for its actions.”34 The court reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.35  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
   
Presented with a legal strategy designed to pre-empt likely 
future lawsuits and allow for streamlined resource extraction, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that, though Shell’s practical and 
economic interest in potential litigation might be substantial, such 
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concerns did not of themselves create a justiciable controversy.  
Rather, because no adverse legal interests existed between Shell 
and the environmental groups it sued, Shell’s claim was not 
justiciable, and declaratory judgment was therefore not appropriate. 
Instead of nipping a challenge in the bud, Shell would need to 
await the outcome of any Administrative Procedures Act litigation 
between environmental groups and the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement concerning Shell’s oil spill response 
plans.  
